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Housing inventories rise in declining markets, where prices are falling. This is a puzzle.
If buyers and sellers have symmetric views of the world, sellers should lower their selling price by the same amount as buyers lower their offers, or so it would seem. Given symmetry among buyers and sellers, there would be no change in inventories. An inventory in housing reflects a failure to sell. What is the source of asymmetry that induces sellers to lower prices by less than 1 the amount necessary to clear the market when demand declines?
I suggest the following answer. Sellers who face a non-degenerate distribution of offer values from potential buyers choose a price at which to sell. When demand for their good, say their house, falls, they adjust prices optimally. But, as will be shown, optimal pricing implies that a decline in demand is met by a reduction in price that is insufficient to keep the probability of sale constant. Because there is heterogeneity among buyers, it pays to continue to price at a relatively high level in the hope that a buyer will come along who values the house enough to pay the high asking price. The seller understands that unwillingness to lower the price by a larger amount results in a greater chance that the house will go unsold, but accepts that risk in order to receive a higher price in the instances where the house does sell.
In textbook cases, where demand is deterministic, a fall in demand usually results in both falling price and falling quantity. In some markets, like housing and labor, each item is In some sense, that is tautologically true of all inventory because at a sufficiently low price, the 1 good or input would have been sold. But inventories of sandwiches that sit in a lunch place at 11am are probably best thought about differently from houses left on the market because the price was too high to induce someone to buy. Different types of inventories are discussed below. The sandwich inventory relates to production smoothing because there is upward sloping marginal cost of making sandwiches all at once and because sandwiches are (partially) storable. 1 somewhat idiosyncratic, where one unit is not a perfect substitute for another. A worker or a 2 seller of a house faces a non-degenerate offer distribution and is uncertain about which potential buyer he will encounter at any point in time. In this stochastic environment, one can think of the probability of sale as corresponding to the quantity sold in a deterministic world. In this 3 stochastic environment with costly search, the market does not clear in the classic sense. Items, like houses or workers, go unsold even though there are potential buyers in the market who would pay more than the seller's reservation price. Furthermore, the number of unsold goods is inversely correlated with demand. When demand falls, price declines, but the number of unsold units rises.
Not all markets exhibit this behavior. Stock markets provide a counterexample. When demand for a stock falls, say, because of lower earnings expectations, prices fall accordingly and the market clears. Unlike housing and labor markets, there are no shares that go unsold nor are there unsatisfied buyers who are willing to pay a price above any potential seller's reservation value.
The difference between markets is at least in part related to heterogeneity. In stock markets, each share is identical and traded on organized exchanges, which makes the search problem trivial. Each seller faces a degenerate distribution of potential offers with all the mass concentrated at the market price. There is no unexploited trade possibility that shows up as an See Rosen's (1974) classic paper on how prices adjust to reflect differences in attributes.
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There remains the issue of whether the "marginal cost" curve falls with demand. Normally the 3 answer is no and later, it will be shown that the same negative answer is appropriate here. 2 inventory when the market closes. Further, because there are no inventories, there can be no 4 correlation between inventories and demand movements.
An asymmetry between buyers and sellers is necessary in order for asking prices in housing and labor markets to move too little to keep the probability of sale constant. It is the asymmetry that is generally assumed, namely that demand and supply move independently. In the standard case, when the demand curve shifts, the marginal cost curve does not move with it.
As a result, in the textbook analyses, a fall in demand is generally met with a reduction in price and quantity (in both competition and monopoly). Were the marginal cost curve to fall at the same time as demand declined, the price reduction would be greater and the quantity might not be reduced at all. Later, it will be shown that in housing and other markets where inventories are prevalent, the assumption that supply (in this case, seller's reservation value) does not move with demand is natural and appropriate.
Others have examined pricing and sale probability, especially in housing. Case (2008) provides an excellent overview of the history of housing prices and discusses housing price stickiness in downturns and its potential causes. Inventories are a consequence of sticky prices and Case addresses inventory behavior and its relation to prices.
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In reality, market makers, specialists and other market facilitators who trade on their own 4 account may engage in some price setting, but this is a minor part of the story and relies on heterogeneous valuations among individual buyers and seller. An individual seller of stock can be certain that his shares will be sold at the market price and a buyer can be certain that he will be able to purchase at the market price, even if that price is slightly different at the time of execution than at the time of order. The time in which an unsold share stays on the market is very short.
A nice analysis of different kinds of sellers is provided by Albrecht anderson, Smith and 5 Vroman (2007) . They obtain a relation of time-on-market to price movements because in markets characterized by long market times, the proportion of motivated sellers, who will accept a lower price, rises. Zuehike (1987) also analyzes motivated sellers in a different context and 3
It is reasonable to ask whether inventories should be the variable of interest. In the case of housing, why not just examine home sales? This is analogous to asking whether it is interesting to study the behavior of unemployment instead of or in addition to hiring. Given the amount of attention devoted to both unemployment and inventory in the macroeconomic literature, it seems appropriate to consider some of the microeconomic foundations that might support the existence of inventories, particularly in housing.
Defining Inventory
In order to discuss inventory, it is necessary to define it. Unfortunately, the accepted market definitions of inventory varies by market and is not completely consistent with any one conceptual definition. For example, inventory in the labor market, namely unemployment, does not line up precisely with inventory in the housing market. Workers who currently have jobs, but would like to move are not counted as inventory. Houses that are currently occupied, but are for sale, are counted as inventory. Inventory in oil markets are even more different. Oil that has been pumped and is in storage tanks is called inventory, even if there was no attempt to sell it today.
As such, it is necessary to distinguish different types of inventories and to apply the taxonomy to the various markets under study. These distinctions are discussed later, but so as to avoid being distracted from understanding the theory, let us start with two definitions that define conceptually inventory that is relevant at least in labor and housing markets.
finds that the seller has a stronger incentive to adopt diminishing reservation price if the house is vacant rather than occupied. Asabere and Huffman (1993) emphasize the reverse pattern. For a given seller, in a model with repeat search and heterogeneity, the longer a seller is willing to wait, the higher the expected price received. Related, Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) provide evidence that the higher the asking price, the longer is time on the market. 4
Definition: A good or service is on the market when the owner is willing to bear whatever fixed costs are required to notify at least some subset of potential buyers that the good or service is for sale at some price, announced or implied.
Definition: Strategic inventory is defined as the number of units of a broadly defined good or service that remains unsold on the market. To be strategic inventory, it is necessary that each unit left unsold belongs to a seller who believes that there exists a willing buyer whose valuation exceeds seller's reservation value.
Unemployment and most housing inventory fits this definition. An unemployed worker is one who is actively seeking work which means he is on the market and believes that there is potentially some buyer who will pay more than his reservation wage for his services. Housing inventory consists of those houses announced for sale (generally through the multiple listing service) that did not sell. By listing the house, the seller satisfies the definition of being on the market and will only bear the costs to put the house on the market if he believes that there is at least one potential buyer who will pay more than his reservation value (obvious, but shown later formally).
Markets that are not likely to have strategic inventories are those where the offer distribution is degenerate. This tends to occur in markets that have many units of identical goods (e.g., stock and commodities markets), where formal exchanges exist (in part as a result of homogeneity which makes mass trading easier), or where preferences for the good or service are identical throughout the population. More on the definition of inventory and on the comparison between labor market and housing market concepts is contained in the final section. 5
Other explanations
Rational pricing is the mechanism through which the explanation operates, but there are other potential stories. The first is straight supply and demand that emphasizes causation in the opposite direction. When there is a shock that creates excess supply, prices fall and excess supply means that inventories rise. The inventory is itself evidence of excess supply so when inventories are high, prices fall. There are three problems with this explanation.
First, it remains necessary to explain how the inventories accumulated. An increase in supply or decrease in demand does not by itself mean that inventories rise. If the market cleared perfectly and instantly, prices would fall, but there would be no increase in inventory associated with excess supply. The increase in inventory may be a result of pricing choices, which implies that a strategic pricing element may be buried in this explanation of inventories. Second, there are strong empirical findings that make implausible the excess supply view without some strategic pricing. In the most recent housing market collapse, the inventories to sales ratio reached a low in early 2005 at inventories equal to slightly under four months of sales.
Almost five years later, the inventory-to-sales ratio was still over double the trough ratio and even the absolute level of inventories was well above the 2005 level, despite the fall in sales.
Without some stickiness in prices or change in technology that makes larger inventories optimal, it is very difficult to explain so much persistence in excess supply. The same inventory persistence, albeit for shorter periods, is seen in the auto industry for new car inventories, even Indeed, Case and Shiller (1989a) A completely different explanation relies on psychological factors. Sellers may be unwilling to lower their prices, say, because they are reluctant to accept less than they paid for the house. This seems tantamount to assuming the answer. Prices are not lowered enough because sellers are unwilling to lower them enough. But there are some intellectual underpinnings to this view, based on laboratory experiment data. Tversky and Kahneman's (1991) notions of loss aversion is a more technical and general concept that fits this rationale.
Although this surely has a ring of truth to it, there remain problems with adopting loss aversion as an explanation.
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First, sellers sometimes do take losses, accepting less than they paid for the house. For example, during January, 2010 in Sacramento, California, over one-fifth of the house sales were at levels that not only fell short of the purchase price, but were short of the amount owed on the Genesove and Mayer (2001) argue that sellers' aversion to realizing losses makes them resist 7 lowering prices and helps explain the positive price-volume correlation in real estate markets. A similar theme is pushed for assets in Odean (1998) . Related, Case and Shiller (1989b) Second, there are well-known theories that imply the opposite behavior by sellers.
Specifically, panic selling that results because all rush to sell in a declining market is the opposite phenomenon of reluctance to accept a lower price. Rather than holding on to a given 9 price and hoping to sell, the seller wants to get rid of the merchandise "at any price," to avoid being the last person standing in a game of musical chairs. Indeed, the decline in the Dow 10 Jones Industrial Average from over 14,000 in October, 2007 to around 6,500 in March, 2009, occurred at the same time that house prices were falling, but falling too slowly to keep inventories constant. Why were some and sometimes the same, individuals who were reluctant to sell their houses at low prices so anxious to sell their stocks at huge losses just to get out of the market? Why did not fear of future declines in housing prices induce sellers to dump their houses quickly, accepting low prices and driving inventories down? A good theory must be able to determine when one behavior holds and when the other behavior holds, otherwise it is neither refutable nor testable. (2006) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009) , which suggests that markets act in capricious 9 ways because of underlying psychological factors. Their approach seems better suited to explaining excessive volatility than to explaining a price-stickiness bias in one direction or another, necessary for the correlation between inventories and demand.
Among the early theoretical contributions are Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch (1992) , 10 Banerjee (1992) and Bulow and Klemperer (1994) . An early empirical application involving mutual funds and trading is Grinblatt, M., S. Titman and R. Wermers (1995) .
In this vein, it might be argued that houses are different from stock and that "endowment 11 effects" are stronger for houses than for stock. Perhaps, but how does this extend to other 8
By contrast, the theory offered in this paper gives a clear prediction that housing markets will exhibit increasing strategic inventory with falling prices, but that markets for homogeneous goods, like those for homogeneous commodities, will not behave in this way. The key is that housing markets combine heterogeneity of preferences with idiosyncracy among the goods for sale that results in a non-degenerate offer distribution for the individual seller. In commodity markets, all units are identical, so the offer distribution is degenerate and there is no pricing strategy that results in a probability of sale other than one or zero. If the probability of sale is one, goods do not show up as inventory. If the reservation price exceeds the market price, the probability of sale is zero and it is not put on the market in the first place. With housing, heterogeneity in valuation by potential buyers for a given house gives the seller the ability to price strategically and to accept a probability of sale that is between zero and one.
The argument is made in two stages. First, it is shown that a seller with a given reservation value, who is completely aware of a decline in demand, does not lower his price enough to keep the probability of sale constant. Second, it is shown that sellers do not reduce their reservation values when demand falls by enough to keep the probability of sale constant.
Motivating Data
Some basic numbers from the housing market help motivate the theory that comes below.
Using data (summary statistics in appendix A) from the National Association of Realtors, the goods? Is a car more like a house or more like a stock? What about gold? How about a gold watch? Even for houses, the endowment effect story is incomplete. When demand is increasing, sellers let go of their houses very quickly, sometimes running auctions or allowing their houses to be sold before they are even on the market. Why does the endowment effect not bite strongly on the upside, keeping sellers from letting go of their houses? 9
Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the inventoryto-sales ratio for all houses, existing and new, was constructed. The price of houses, adjusted Each price index has its strengths and weaknesses. The FHFA index covers the entire country, 13 whereas S&P Case Shiller is limited to selected metropolitan areas. But the FHFA reports data for a subset of houses, namely those that are in the "conforming loan" category, which leaves out the highest priced houses.
The level of inventory-to-sales ratio (rather than changes in that ratio) is used because the lag 14 structure is uncertain and because the relation is not causal. The presumption is that the level of inventory-to-sales is a better indicator of changes in demand over the relevant period than is, say, the monthly change in inventory-to-sales ratio simply because the noise in the monthly inventory change data is too great. Also, because the expected duration to sale is more than one month (and variable with demand), this month's inventory change is not necessarily related to this month's price change. However, a check of changes on changes reveals a strong negative relationship also, which becomes weakly negative and insignificant in Cochrane-Orcutt regressions.
10 Figure 1 The diagram shows that the relationship is negative. Inventories are highest when housing prices are declining most rapidly. The simple correlations are reported in Table 1 . They reveal a negative relation of inventory/sales to change in housing prices.
15 Table 1 Correlation of Inventory-to-Sales Ratio with Price Changes 
Model
The model is general and relates potentially to a large variety of goods, the most important of which are those goods for which the offer distribution reflects significant dispersion. For concreteness and to fit perhaps the most important case, the discussion is cast in terms of houses. In actual housing purchases, bargaining is part of the story, but this model abstracts from that by assuming that the seller's actual reservation price is the one posted, rather than some higher price as an opening gambit.
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Consider a single period decision for the seller of a given house. The seller posts a price R. Buyers' valuations are given by V ~ g(V). For simplicity, assume the seller encounters one buyer whose valuation is drawn from that distribution.
The probability of a sale is the probability that the seller encounters a buyer whose valuation exceeds R. Thus, the probability of a sale is given by 1-G(R) where G(V) is the distribution function of density g (V) . The seller's problem is then to maximize (1)
Value of the House = R [1-G(R)] + S G(R)
Fuchs and Skrypacz (2010) obtain a relation between time on the market and prices by 16 focusing on the amount of delay in bargaining, which results when new traders appear or other outside options become available.
There is a literature that examines list price and sale probabilities, both theoretical and empirical. For example, Arnold (1999) explores a model where buyers use asking price as information and then make a buy decision after touring the house. See also Chen and Rosenthal (1996) for another model of price setting with search, where inspection provides information with a mention of housing markets. Glower, Haurin and Hendershott (1998) examine the influence of listing price on time to sale and find no relationship. Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) find different behavior using English data, where listing price is found to influence the arrival of offers and therefore the rate of sale. Yavas and Yang (1995) find that the effect of listing price depends on the overall cost of the home (high, middle or low). Of course, a key issue here is how list price is related endogenously to market conditions and the relation of list to reservation price and sale price. 12
The first-order condition is or
The second-order condition is which does not always have the negative sign needed for (2) to yield a maximum.
In this framework, inventories are unsold houses at the end of the period. The size of the expected inventory in a market then is the number of houses on the market times the probability that each of those houses goes unsold. The probability that a house does not sell is simply G(R), the probability that a seller encounters a buyer whose valuation lies below the reservation price R.
Sellers Do Not Lower Price Enough to Keep the Probability of Sale Constant
The primary issue is determining the effect of a decline in market demand on price, R and inventories, here represented by the probability that a house does not sell, G(R). Represent a For now, take the number of houses on the market as given. In a later section, variations in 17 number of houses on the market are explored. That effect is likely to work in the opposite direction with fewer houses on the market during periods of declining demand. 13 decline in demand as a shift in the valuation that potential buyers place on the house. Let H(V) 18 represent a distribution that is first-order stochastically dominated by
Denote R , where i=G,H, the price that the seller chooses for the distribution G or H.
Condition (3) holds for all distributions where g(V) < h(V) and where g'(V), h'(V)>0
(proof in Appendix B). This condition is somewhat restrictive and even when met, is informative only of price movements, not of the correlation between price movements and sale probabilities.
Consequently, it is instructive to consider specific distributions for which condition (3) holds and when the probability of sale declines with falling R as well.
An alternative structure would allow the arrival rate to vary with market conditions (see, for 18 example, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) ). The model contained in this paper assumes one arrival per period and the offer distribution shifts. But the questions and implications are the same. A lower arrival rate results in a lower sale probability only when the price is kept sufficiently high. A "motivated" seller could increase the probability of sale even when the arrival rate falls by lowering the price sufficiently. 14 Substitution into (2) yields 19 It is immediate that R rises in a and d. A shift in market demand reflected in a leftward shift of the offer distribution can be characterized as a decline in a. We can then think of H(V) above as the distribution with a lower value of a. Furthermore, the probability of no sale is given by
Probability no sale = G(R) = so the probability of no sale decreases in a . As demand declines, reflected in a leftward shift of the offer distribution where a falls, price falls and the sale probability falls. This is consistent with the primary empirical result to be explained -inventories vary inversely with price changes.
Normal: Let V be distributed normally with mean ëì (with ì>0) and standard deviation ëó, where ë is a scaling parameter. Let S be sufficiently low so that the normal is an almost perfect approximation of the truncated normal that results for the normal above S. Let the reservation value also be ëS. Then it is easy to show numerically that That is, if the normal is just scaled up, the optimal price adjusts correspondingly and the probability of no sale remains unchanged.
The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied because g'(R) = 0.
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A decline in demand can be characterized, as in the case of the uniform above, as a leftward shift in the offer distribution, i.e., for a given ó and ë, ì falls. Again, numerical analysis reveals that and that
For example, when S=20, ì=100, ó=20, R=78 and the probability of no sale = 0.18.
When ì falls to 80, R falls to 67, the probability of no sale rises to 0.25. The pattern is monotonic.
Once again, the general empirical phenomenon holds. As the mean of the offer distribution declines, reflecting a decrease in demand, prices fall but the probability that the good remains unsold rises.
Gamma: Let V be distributed as gamma with density function given by
where is the shape parameter. The mean is given by mean = á and is the gamma function, given by 16 Let S=2. A downward shift in the offer distribution can be characterized by a reduction in á. Again, numerical analysis reveals that for all á>1, reductions in á result in decreases in the price and increased probability of no sale.
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For example, if á=3, the mean of the offer distribution is 3, the optimal price is 3.7 and the probability of no sale is 0.71. As the market declines, as reflected in a shift of á from 3 to, say 2, the mean falls to 2, the optimal price falls to 3.3 and the probability of no sale rises to 0.84.
As before, declines in demand result in a reduction in the reservation price, but not by an amount large enough to keep the probability of sale the same. Since the probability of sale falls with demand, inventories rise when price declines.
Exponential: It is possible to construct situations for which it is not true that price and the probability of no sale move in opposite directions. The exponential distribution (a gamma á=1)
is one such case. This can be shown analytically as follows.
Let S=0. The density function for the exponential is given by with From (2), When á=1, the gamma becomes the exponential distribution. The result does not hold for this 20 case, as discussed below and so á>1 must be assumed.
While the reservation price varies with â and in fact equals â, the probability of no sale is constant at 1 -1/e = 0.632. There is no variation in inventories at all if the distribution is exponential. Price changes as a result of demand conditions, but they do so in a way as to hold the sale probability exactly constant.
The results obtained in this section are analogous to those in deterministic markets. In normal circumstances, a decline in demand results in lower prices and lower quantities, but there anomalous cases for which that is not true. Strange demand shifts can result in a monopolist choosing to lower his price, but to increase quantity sold.
21
Here, demand falls from D1 to D2, but the odd nature of demand means that price falls and quantity rises. (MR and MC refer to marginal revenue and marginal cost, respectively.) 18
This section shows that in standard cases, prices and inventories move in opposite directions. All is completely rational. The seller understands perfectly that buyers' valuations have fallen and now are below their prior values. There is no stickiness in prices. Prices do fall, but inventories rise simply because it is optimal when the distribution shifts left to lower the price, but not by enough to maintain the same probability of a sale. So the answer to the puzzle is the traditional one: when demand falls, a price setting seller absorbs some of the decline through lower prices and some through reductions in quantities sold. Here, the seller absorbs some of the decline through lower prices and some through a reduced probability of sale.
Reservation Values Do Not Fall with the Offer Distribution
The result already derived assumed that S did not vary with the distribution of offers.
This is analogous to assuming that marginal cost does not change when the demand curve shifts.
But what happens to R and the inventories (here, the probability of no sale) when S varies with the shifter in the offer distribution, k?
For Inventories to Remain Unchanged, Reservation Value Must Move One-for-One with Demand
Do reservation values move enough to keep inventories unchanged? In general, they do G
not. Consider a new distribution H(V) such that H(V)=G(V+k) and h(V)=g(V+k) for V=R . Let
G H H H G H G R be defined such that R = R -k. Then,
H(R )=G(R ) and h(R )=g(R ).
There are two parts to the derivation. First, it is shown that if S moves one-for-one with G H k, R = R -k is the optimal price when the distribution function is H(V). Thus, the optimal price 19 falls by k and the probability of sale remains unchanged. Second, it will be shown that S moves less than one-for-one with k, which results in an increase in inventories with falling prices.
For a given reservation price S, a shift in the offer distribution from G to H results in lowering the price by exactly the amount of the shift, k. Recall that the optimum price with the initial distribution, G(V) was given by (2) as
because H(R ) = G(R ) and h(R ) = g(R ). Also, or H G
Suppose that S = S -k . Then, G H which is eq. (2). So R = R -k is the optimal price when the distribution function is H(V) as
It follows immediately that H(R ) = G(R ) because H(V) = G(V+k)
at V=R . Thus, the probability of sale remains constant if the seller's valuation drops by exactly the amount of the shift.
Reservation Values Do Not Move One-for-One with the Offer Distribution
The second part of the argument is that reservation values do not fall one-for-one with the offer distribution. For other goods and services, that they do not move symmetrically is natural. In the case of labor, there is no reason to believe that a worker's value of leisure or even his marginal product at another firm would move identically with the change in the demand for his output at his current firm. For example, a decline in the auto industry that reduces the demand price for an auto worker does not alter the value of his leisure nor does it reduce the amount that he could earn elsewhere by the same amount. Similarly, when demand for a product falls, we assume that the marginal cost curve is unaltered because the general equilibrium effects on costs resulting from shifts in demand in the good being produced are expected to be very small.
The same is true in the case of a new house, where the builder's objective function is different from the buyer's. However, with existing houses, the current and future residents usually want the house for the same purpose, namely to live in it. Elastic supply of new construction guarantees that as long as demand declines are not sufficient to prevent new houses from being produced and sold, the marginal seller reservation value is determined by new houses, not by existing houses.
This argument is too strong. Because houses are idiosyncratic, new houses cannot be viewed as perfect substitutes for any given existing house. If they were, then the seller would be a pure price taker, heterogeneity of preferences would be irrelevant and houses would be like shares of stock. Consequently, it is useful to consider how sellers of existing houses reduce their reservation values when demand declines to cover cases where new houses are not the marginal sale.
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Although the owner/seller's valuation is not independent of the buyer's valuation, in general, forces that shift the offer distribution affect V by more than S. The logic is straightforward. In order for there to be a sale, the buyer must value the attributes of the house more than the seller does. Any change in the attributes tends to affect the most those who place the highest value on those attributes. Since the seller already places a relatively low value on the house's attributes, a decline in their levels has less of an absolute effect on the seller's valuation than on the buyer's valuation.
To understand more fully how demand shifts work in housing markets and other markets, it is useful to go behind the distribution of housing price valuations. For a sale to occur, it is necessary that S<V . Thus, required is that
If í > í , then ë < ë which also means that and the seller's reservation value will be less sensitive to general market conditions than the buyer's valuation.
There is reason to believe that expectation of í -í is positive. Because the seller owns the house and has lived in it, the house has specific value to the current owner that would not transfer to a new owner. Emotional attachment to the home associated with memories, personal relationships with neighbors, knowing local merchants, getting around the neighborhood and s i other factors are likely to make the expected value of í higher than that of í .
The conclusion is that under normal circumstances, a decline in demand does not lower S by as much as it does the relevant value of V. Consequently, housing prices fall with demand, but not by enough to keep the probability of sale constant. It is also possible that sales in the housing market reflect changes in supply, rather than changes in demand, where the reservation value, S changes by more than the offer value, V.
Formally, this requires that í < í , which may be unusual, but not impossible. Suppose, for example, that instead of attaching positive value to the neighbors, the current owner attaches negative value, say, because of a personal dispute. If the owner likes generic house services s i more than most (so that ë >ë ), he might have been willing to stay in the house when A was high, despite his distaste for the neighbors. When A falls, the change reduces the seller's reservation value by more than the buyers' so he puts the house on the market.
Option Value
In determining the seller's reservation value, it is useful to remember that many owners own houses that are mortgaged. The existence of a mortgage gives the owner a put option. By defaulting on the loan, the owner can put part of any loss in house value to the bank at a cost, namely the effect of a default on his credit rating.
When prices fall, the value of the put option goes up for the seller as it is closer to or further in the money. New borrowers, though, pay fair market value for their loan that includes the value of the put option, so there is an asymmetry that grows as prices fall. This is another force that keeps S high relative to V. It also yields the empirical implication that prices should be "stickier" for houses that have large outstanding mortgages. The owners of these houses should be more reluctant to lower prices because they can put part of the liability to the bank and this option value rises with falling housing prices. Genesove and Mayer (1997) find that owners with higher loan-to-value ratios ask higher prices, have longer expected times on the market and obtain higher prices conditional on a sale. Their results are consistent with the option-value idea, although they emphasize liquidity, arguing that those with high LTV ratios resulting from a housing bust are less able to place a down payment on a new home if they sell their old one.
Discussion and Extensions

Heterogeneity is Essential
The primary result requires heterogeneity of preferences. The intuition is that the seller does not lower the price enough to keep the probability of sale constant because he still hopes to find a buyer who values the house at a price higher than the one posted. Without heterogeneity, there can be no strategic inventories. The only price that a seller can set is the unique value of V.
Any price above results in the certainty that the house will not sell; any price below discards revenue since the probability of a sale is one at R=V.
In competitive markets with many units of identical homogeneous goods, no seller ever sets a price that results in a probability of sale less than one so there can be no correlation between prices and strategic inventory. The purest case is the stock market, where one share is indistinguishable from the next. The market clears; there are no inventories.
Three Kinds of Inventories
The focus has been on the strategic nature of inventory, which cannot exist in organized markets with homogeneous goods. But inventory may exist for other reasons. Two additional ones are discussed here: accidental inventory and production smoothing inventory.
Accidental inventory is that which would result even in an industry with completely homogeneous goods traded on an organized market because of random supply disruptions in the production or distribution processes. For example, a small price-taking tomato farmer might be left with tomato inventory when the truck used to take the crop to market breaks down.
Production smoothing inventory may also exist even in well-organized markets with homogeneous goods. Production smoothing inventory is that which results when a firm produces today with the intention of storing the goods in anticipation of higher prices tomorrow.
Even though the seller faces a degenerate offer distribution at a point in time, the buildup of inventory is part of the profit maximizing plan. Production smoothing inventory arises because production is optimally less variable than sales. Inventories of oil and other natural resources that are mined fit this case as are the sandwiches that sit on a lunch counter at 11:30 am, waiting for the lunch crowd to arrive. Although classified as inventories, these situations do not fit the definition of strategic inventory, where a sale does not occur despite there being a buyer with a valuation higher than a seller's reservation value.
As an empirical matter, it may be difficult to distinguish between the source or type of inventory that one observes in the market, so it is useful to understand when accidental or production-smoothing inventories may confound the interpretation of what is going on in markets where inventories are observed.
Initially, let us focus on accidental inventory and put aside production smoothing inventory, which is conceptually more difficult to distinguish from strategic inventory. Because y is defined as random inventory, it is independent of both x and q so 24 Then (4) can be written as
where Noting that
There may be a small correlation between accidental inventory and market prices because firms 24 should take into account the cost of wasted goods in determining the investment in preventing supply mishaps. 27 eq. (5) can be rewritten as
Further,
The observed correlation between inventories and price changes is decreasing in the proportion of total variance that is strategic rather than accidental. Since the correlation is nonpositive, a decreasing correlation means a correlation that moves from zero toward negative one.
At the extreme, when è=1 , from (6), corr(z,q) = corr(x,q), because all inventory is strategic. At the other extreme, when è=0, from (6), corr(z,q) = 0, because all inventory is accidental.
The negative relation of price movements to inventories should be more pronounced in heterogeneous markets in which each good is somewhat idiosyncratic. In markets with many units of homogeneous goods, accidental inventory dominates and in the limit, strategic inventories are absent. In the housing context, low-cost condominium apartments are more homogeneous than are large mansions. As a result, there should be a stronger negative correlation between price movements and inventories for ten-million dollar mansions than for standard condominiums.
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This does not imply that prices fall more in heterogeneous markets. That depends on a number 25 of factors, including the distribution of demand shocks across different markets (e.g., homogeneous markets may be more or less susceptible to shocks than heterogeneous markets) and the pace at which learning occurs in different markets as discussed in Lazear (1986) . That model sought to explain the timing of price changes over time, how the probability of sale varied with the rate of price cuts and how both varied with the diffusion in underlying priors. As argued in Lazear (1986) , mansions, which have thinner markets with higher underlying variance in 28
Production Smoothing and Inventory
Recall that production smoothing inventory is inventory that arises because firms produce today and store in anticipation of higher prices tomorrow. There are a number of necessary conditions for there to be production-smoothing inventory. First, the good must be storable. Second, marginal cost must be upward sloping. Third, unless the entire stock of existing goods is measured as inventory, production smoothing does not pertain to existing goods for resale. Although an existing good can be turned into a future good at storage costs,
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there is no reason to put it on the market where it registers as an inventory until the good is ready for sale. In the case of housing, all existing homes could be counted as "production inventory"
because they or the land on which they sit will be sold or transferred at some point. However, measured inventory is restricted to houses formally on the market at any given point in time and does not generalize to the stock of all houses.
27
The existence of production smoothing inventory is problematic at an empirical level because it makes it more difficult to test the hypothesis behind strategic inventory. Production offers, will exhibit stickier pricing and will have longer time on the market. Noticing the result related to thickness of markets, An (2009) uses a modified version of Lazear (1986) , coupled with an instrumental variables approach to investigate the relation of selling price to time on the market. He finds a negative relationship between them. See also Read (1988) and Haurin (1988) for points similar to that in Lazear (1986) . Read (1988) in particular emphasizes the relation of reservation price to offers received and notes that this addresses the seemingly paradoxical behavior of sellers to hold on to a property without price reductions sufficient to clear the market.
When production smoothing occurs, an arbitrage condition sets the maximum difference 26 between future and spot prices at storage costs since supply in the future can be created by producing today and storing until the future date.
As shown below, both theoretically and empirically, resale goods are put on the market pro-27 cyclically and tend therefore to work counter, rather than in the same direction as strategic inventory. 29 smoothing can exist even in markets that have many homogeneous units of a good, such as oil.
Because of increasing marginal cost of extraction, oil producers may pump and store oil that they do not want to sell today if they believe that prices in the future will be higher and if it would be cheaper to extract oil more smoothly over time.
Production smoothing inventory does not fit the definition of strategic inventory because at the point at which the good shows up as inventory, there are no buyers willing to pay price for the good higher than the seller's reservation value. Part of this is measurement. Oil that owners are unwilling to sell at today's prices, held in storage tanks awaiting higher future prices, is not "on the market." Still, it is generally counted in inventory. Because this measured inventory is countercyclic (firms hold more when they expect future prices to be higher than present prices), production smoothing inventory moves with the cycle in the same way as strategic inventory, making it difficult to disentangle the two explanations.
Although difficult, it is not impossible to test the strategic inventory hypothesis even in the presence of production smoothing inventory. Most of the goods that are the subject of this discussion do not satisfy the three conditions necessary for production smoothing inventory. A comparison between stock markets and housing markets compares primarily resale markets, where production smoothing does not arise. Owners of existing houses, which comprise the bulk of houses for sale, do not go on the market before they are intended for sale. New houses are more problematic. A contractor might build a house today even when prices are low if he
anticipates that prices will rise in the future and if it is cheaper to smooth construction out over time.
when demand is low than when demand is high. This is intuitive. A decline in demand makes it less likely that the house sells and if it does sell, the price at which it sells is lower.
Consequently, given fixed cost, it is less valuable to put a house on the market in periods of low demand than in periods of high demand.
As a consequence, the "on the market" effect tends to work in the opposite direction of the strategic pricing effect as far as total inventories are concerned. The fact that there is a strong negative relation of inventories to price changes, as shown in Figure 1 and described in Table 1 , implies that the effect on inventories of strategic pricing outweighs any effect of putting fewer houses on the market during market downturns.
The theoretical prediction that houses are put on the market procyclically can be checked
empirically. An accounting identity is that
Inventory -Inventory = Net additions to Market -Sales
(8) Net additions to Market = Inventory -Inventory + Sales Using (8) and the data that were used for Figure 1 and Table 1 , a series of net additions of houses to the market is derived. Table 2 reports the correlation between net additions and price changes, both FHFA and S&P Case Shilller series. As the theory predicts, houses put on the market move procyclically. When prices are rising, more houses are put on the market. During declining markets, fewer houses go on the market. Despite this, inventories rise in declining markets because strategic pricing prevents prices from falling rapidly enough to keep the probability of sale constant and this swamps the fact that fewer houses are up for sale.
Recap
The empirical observation that inventories rise when prices fall is explained by the fact that the optimal response to a shift in the offer distribution is to change price, but not by enough to keep the probability of sale constant. When demand falls, the seller optimally reduces price, but also allows the probability of a sale to fall. This is complicated by changes in the reservation value that may accompany a change in the offer distribution. But the seller's reservation value does not change by as much as the shift in the offer distribution. Consequently, inventories and price changes are negatively correlated.
Local markets
Housing markets are local and except when large nationally correlated shocks are present, the national data mask what is going on at the local level. Table 3 The results show that sales, which are now a proxy for the probability of sale, move positively with the change in prices, as expected. When prices are falling, the probability of sale should decline. Table 3 presents the results for regressions (clustered by state and not clustered) of both de-trended and non-de-trended sales on quarterly price changes. The results confirm expectations. Sales are positively related to price changes in the state panel data. Furthermore, since these data report existing rather than new home sales, the price and sales effect cannot be Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) emphasize differences in elasticity of housing supply in 29 explaining price movements across local housing markets. The emphasis in their paper is on bubbles, but their point that price and quantity movements depend on local conditions is what is most relevant here.
At the national level, a regression of ln(inventory/sales) on ln(inventory) yields an R of 0.33. A regression of ln(inventory/sales) on ln(sales) yields an R of 0.56.
2
Other evidence on the relation of sales to the sales-to-inventory ratio is provided by Falk and Lee (2004) and by Kahn (2000) , the latter finding movements in sales without corresponding movements in inventories. Inventories and Market Parallels Unemployment and reservation wage behavior are well-studied. Each housing market concept has an analogue in the labor market. Figure 2 is useful for the comparison.
Occupied homes are like employed workers (area "Occupied Homes" corresponds to area "Employed".) Shadow inventory (defined as houses that are being constructed or could be sold but are not currently for sale) are like workers who are out of the labor force (area "Shadow
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Inventory" corresponds to area "Out of the Labor Force".) Some houses sell without ever being unoccupied, which is like a worker who is hired from another firm without an intervening spell of unemployment (area "Occupied for Sale, Sold" corresponds to area "Employed, Hired without Spell of Unemployment).
The sale of a house (area "Occupied for Sale, Sold" plus area "Unoccupied for Sale, Sold) is like the hiring of a worker (area "Unemployed, Hired" plus area "Employed, Hired without Spell of Unemployment"), although it is probably more reasonable to argue that buying a house is like acquiring the rights to the workers services for life. When a worker is hired, it is for services rendered for a specified period of time that is (usually) less than the lifetime of the worker. Purchasing a house is closer to "hiring" labor under the kind of contracts that exist under slavery.
Some unoccupied houses are purchased, which is like hiring a worker from the pool of unemployed (area "Unoccupied for Sale, Sold" corresponds to area "Unemployed, Hired").
Some houses are occupied and for sale, but did not sell in the current period. That is analogous to a worker who is currently employed, would like to move, but did not get hired.
(Area "Occupied for Sale, Unsold" corresponds to area "Employed, Want to move, Not Hired.") Note that definitions are not aligned. A worker in that category is not classified as unemployed, but an occupied house that is up for sale, but did not get sold is part of inventory. The other component of housing inventory consists of unoccupied houses that are for sale, but did not get sold. They are like unemployed workers who fail to get hired in that period. (Area "Unemployed, not hired" corresponds to area "Unoccupied for Sale, Unsold.") Thus, housing inventory includes units the conceptual equivalent of which would not be called unemployment in the labor market (Area "Occupied, for Sale, Unsold" is part of housing inventory; area"Employed, Want to Move, not Hired" is not part of unemployment).
Very close parallels between labor and housing market concepts exist, but practical definitions used in the real world cause measured unemployment and measured housing inventory to diverge a bit conceptually. Still, studying inventory and trying to understand why it exists is analogous to studying unemployment in the labor market.
Conclusion
Prices and inventories move inversely in some markets. Housing is the most notable case.
This is a puzzle because if sellers and buyers updated their beliefs on market conditions in a similar manner, one might expect that sellers would adjust their prices and there would be no price-inventory relationship observed.
The explanation of the negative correlation between prices and inventories is based on rational pricing when sellers of idiosyncratic goods or services face heterogeneous valuations among buyers. Declining demand induces sellers to reduce their prices, but not by enough to keep the probability of sale the same. This is a rational surplus maximizing strategy. Sellers understand that the partial price responses increase the chances of being stuck with unsold goods. But they willingly take this chance because it pays to hold out in the hope that they will encounter a buyer who places a sufficiently high value on their good or service to buy it at the high price.
The negative correlation between prices and inventories (or probability of no sale) results only in markets where sellers face non-degenerate offer distributions. In markets where there are many sellers of identical units, like a stock market, every seller can sell only at the market price.
As a result, the negative relation of price movements to inventories should be more pronounced 38 in heterogeneous markets. Housing and labor markets both have units that are imperfect substitutes for one another. In housing markets, there is a clear inverse correlation between prices and the inventory-to-sales ratio. In labor markets, unemployment rises when demand falls.
Finally, fewer houses should be put on the market during periods of declining demand and this prediction is also borne out by the data.
